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Torts
by Deron R. Hicks*
and Travis C. Hargrove"
This Article surveys recent developments in Georgia tort law between
June 1, 2009 and May 31, 2010.'
I.

PREMISES LIABILITY

In American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Brown,' the Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed the Georgia Court of Appeals reversal of the grant of
summary judgment in favor of a movie theater in a trip and fall case.'
The plaintiff in Brown attended a movie at one of the defendant's
theaters. Shortly before the movie ended, an employee of the defendant
was called upon to clean up a spill that had occurred several feet away
from the door of the auditorium. The employee placed a wet-floor sign
over the spill. When the movie ended, the plaintiff and her family exited
the crowded auditorium. By the time the plaintiff reached the wet-floor
sign, it had fallen and was lying on the floor. Because of the crowd, the
plaintiff did not see the sign. The plaintiff tripped over the sign, fell,
and was injured. The plaintiff thereafter filed suit against the
defendant. The Georgia State Court of Clayton County granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed.'

* Partner in the firm of Page, Scrantom, Sprouse, Tucker & Ford, P.C., Columbus,
Georgia. Adjunct Professor of Law, Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law.
University of Georgia (B.F.A., 1990); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law
(J.D., cum laude, 1993).
** Partner in the firm of Page, Scrantom, Sprouse, Tucker & Ford, P.C., Columbus,
Georgia. Auburn University (B.A., magna cum laude, 2001); Mercer University, Walter F.
George School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2004).
1. For analysis of Georgia tort law during the prior survey period, see Deron R. Hicks
& Travis C. Hargrove, Torts, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 61 MERCER L. REV. 335
(2009).
2. 285 Ga. 442, 679 S.E.2d 25 (2009).
3. Id. at 442, 679 S.E.2d at 26.
4. Id. at 442-43, 679 S.E.2d at 26-27.

317

318

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

The court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling and held that a
jury could reasonably find that the crowd exiting the auditorium
prevented the plaintiff from seeing the floor, thereby "rendering the
fallen 'Wet Floor' sign useless as a warning device."5 According to the
court of appeals, if the jury reached this conclusion, the defendant could
be held liable for breaching its duty of care to the public.' The supreme
court granted the defendant's petition for writ of certiorari.' Following
a review of the record, the supreme court affirmed the court of appeals
decision.'
The supreme court noted that the plaintiff in a trip and fall case "must
plead and prove that: (1) the defendant had actual or constructive
knowledge of the hazard; and (2) the plaintiff, despite exercising
ordinary care for his or her own personal safety, lacked knowledge of the
hazard due to the defendant's actions or to conditions under the
defendant's control." In Brown "[o]nly the first prong of the two-part
. . . test [was] at issue"-that is, whether the defendant had actual or

constructive knowledge of the alleged tripping hazard.o
The supreme court first addressed the defendant's argument that it
lacked actual knowledge of the alleged hazard." The defendant argued
"that while it knew the sign was there, it did not know the sign was a
hazard, and ipso facto, it had no 'actual knowledge' of the hazard that
According to the plaintiff, however, the
injured [the plaintiff].""
placement of the sign itself created an unreasonable risk of harm,
particularly since it was placed in a high-traffic area immediately
outside a crowded auditorium. The plaintiff argued that whether any of
the defendant's employees actually saw the sign after it fell over was
irrelevant-the defendant breached its duty of care simply by placing the
sign in that location. In support of this argument, the plaintiffs
produced expert testimony that the type of sign used by the defendant
constituted a hazard when used in high-traffic areas."
The supreme court rejected the defendant's argument."' Citing
Robinson v. Kroger Co.," the supreme court concluded that "[tihe

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 443, 679 S.E.2d at 27.
Id. at 443-44, 679 S.E.2d at 27.
Id at 444, 679 S.E.2d at 27.
Id at 442, 679 S.E.2d at 26.
Id. at 444, 679 S.E.2d at 27-28.
Id. at 445, 679 S.E.2d at 28.
Id at 445, 679 S.E.2d at 29.
Id. at 446, 679 S.E.2d at 29.
Id.
Id
268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997).
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decision whether to recognize the [plaintiffs] theory of recovery as valid
under Georgia premises liability law is precisely the type of legal policy
judgment we instructed in Robinson must be left to a jury to decide in
The court noted that
light of all the attendant circumstances."'
saw the sign after
actually
although none of the defendant's employees
had put
employees
it fell, it was undisputed that one of the defendant's
policies."
defendant's
the
with
the sign over the spill in accordance
According to the court, the defendant's policies required the employee to
place the sign over the spill "even if that meant putting it on the floor
directly in the path of a large, oncoming crowd of pedestrians.""
Therefore, the court concluded that summary judgment was not
appropriate on the issue of whether the defendant had breached its legal
duty. 9
Although the supreme court's ruling on the issue of "actual knowledge"
effectively disposed of the appeal, the court also addressed the defendant's argument that it lacked "constructive knowledge" of the hazard.' In a manner consistent with prior trip and fall decisions, the
defendant argued that there were no employees of the defendant in the
area who could have seen the fallen sign and removed the hazard. The
defendant contended that as a result, the plaintiffs had failed to show
that the defendant had constructive knowledge of the hazard.21
However, the supreme court rejected the defendant's argument and
noted
[T]hat we are not inclined to interpret the concept of "constructive
knowledge" in such a way that it would exonerate [the defendant's]
employees for failing to notice and remedy the tripping hazard when
their excuse-the inability to see it due to the large mass of people
pouring out of the theater-is the same reason [the plaintiffl could not
see the hazard and take actions to avoid it.'

16. Brown, 285 Ga. at 446, 679 S.E.2d at 29 (citing Robinson, 268 Ga. at 743, 748,493
S.E.2d at 410-11, 414).
17. Id. at 445-46, 679 S.E.2d at 29.
18. Id. at 446, 679 S.E.2d at 29.
19. Id. at 448, 679 S.E.2d at 30.
20. Id. at 446-47, 679 S.E.2d at 29.
21. Id. at 446, 679 S.E.2d at 29.
22. Id. at 446-47, 679 S.E.2d at 29. The use of the two-part test from Robinson seems
somewhat at odds with the facts of this case and the theory of liability. The allegation in
Brown was that the defendant was negligent in allowing the wet-floor sign to be placed in
a hallway that the defendant knew would shortly be filled with a large crowd of people.
Id. at 443, 679 S.E.2d at 27. The issue of knowledge, actual or constructive, is moot. The
defendant clearly knew that the sign would be placed in the hallway-in fact, the
defendant's policies actually required it to be placed there. Id. at 446, 679 S.E.2d at 29.
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Finally, the court addressed the defendant's contention that the court
of appeals decision created uncertainty as to when and under what
circumstances the use of a wet-floor sign would be appropriate." The
court, however, expressed little sympathy for this position and noted
that "this problem is an inherent part of our system of trial by jury in
civil cases."' Although the court acknowledged the widespread use of
such signs and their value in preventing injuries, the court held that the
use of wet-floor signs does not "automatically immunize[I merchants
from suits for damages for injuries caused by [the signs]." 25
The court of appeals decision in Kim v. Municipal Market Co.2 ' -another trip and fall case involving a wet-floor sign- followed the Brown
decision. The plaintiff in Kim operated a salad bar and deli at the Sweet
Auburn Curb Market (Curb Market) in Atlanta. Across the aisle from
the plaintiff's booth was another business that leased a cooler from Curb
Market's landlord, the defendant. This particular cooler leaked
frequently, a fact that was known to the plaintiff. On the day of the
incident in question, the cooler had leaked, and a yellow wet-floor sign
had been placed over the leak. At some point, however, the wet-floor
sign fell down. As the plaintiff returned to her booth from parking her
car, she tripped and fell over the fallen sign.' The plaintiff subsequently brought suit against her landlord. ' The trial court granted the

The supreme court's analysis of the knowledge component of the two-part test therefore
appears strained. The facts of this particular case seem more appropriately compared to
situations in which a plaintiff alleges injury as a result of a substance that was
intentionally applied to or placed on the floor. See, e.g., Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon, 246
Ga. 620,272 S.E.2d 327 (1980); Kolomichuk v. Bruno's, Inc., 230 Ga. App. 638,497 S.E,2d
10 (1998). In such cases, the defendant is presumed to have knowledge of the substance
because the defendant actually applied the substance or authorized its application.
Alterman Foods, 246 Ga. at 624, 272 S.E.2d at 330. Under those circumstances, "the
plaintiff must. . . show that the defendant was negligent either in the materials he used
in treating the floor or in the application of them." Id. at 624, 272 S.E.2d at 331.
Similarly, in Brown the plaintiff submitted evidence that the type of sign at issue easily
collapsed (that is, the defendant was negligent in the material he used) and that the sign
should not have been placed immediately outside a crowded theater (that is, the defendant
was negligent in the application of the sign). 285 Ga. at 443, 679 S.E.2d at 27.
23. Brown, 285 Ga. at 447, 679 S.E.2d at 29-30.
24. Id. at 447, 679 S.E.2d at 30.
25. Id.
26. 303 Ga. App. 122, 693 S.E.2d 123 (2010).
27. Id. at 122-24, 693 S.E.2d at 124-25.
28. See id. at 122, 693 S.E.2d at 124.
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defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed."
Finding no error, the court of appeals affirmed.ao
The defendant argued that because the plaintiff had equal knowledge
of the hazard, the defendant was entitled to summary judgment." As
there was little dispute that the plaintiff knew that the leak was a
persistent problem, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision.32 However, in contrast to the decision in Brown, in which the
hazard was the placement of the warning sign,' the plaintiff in Kim
"made no allegation that [the defendant] had actual knowledge that the
warning sign had fallen over into the puddle of water or that the
placement of the warning sign itself created a hazard.""
In Imperial Investments Doraville, Inc. v. Childers,' the court of
appeals reversed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff in a trip and fall
case.' The plaintiff was attending a darts tournament held at a hotel
owned by the defendant. The hallway outside the room in which the
tournament was being held was under renovation. There were rolls of
carpet in the hallway, and the existing carpet was bunched up in areas
on the floor. The plaintiff, however, had traversed the area on several
occasions during the course of the two-day tournament. On the second
day of the tournament, the plaintiff followed a friend into the hallway,
tripped, and fell through a plate-glass window. An expert testified that
the window through which the plaintiff fell should have been safety
glass. The defendant, however, had purchased the hotel after its
construction and had assumed that the windows met the building code
requirements."
The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against the
defendant.' At trial, the plaintiff admitted that he did not know what,
if anything, had caused him to trip and fall.' Nonetheless, the jury
returned a verdict in his favor. The defendant filed a motion for a
directed verdict, which was denied by the trial court, and the defendant
thereafter appealed.40

29. Id.
30. Id. at 123, 693 S.E.2d at 124.

31. Id.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 124, 693 S.E.2d at 125.
285 Ga. at 446, 679 S.E.2d at 29.
303 Ga. App. at 124, 693 S.E.2d at 125.
303 Ga. App. 490, 693 S.E.2d 834 (2010).
Id. at 490, 693 S.E.2d at 835.
Id. at 490-91, 693 S.E.2d at 835-36.
See id. at 490, 693 S.E.2d at 835.
Id. at 490, 492, 693 S.E.2d at 835-36, 837.
Id. at 490-91, 693 S.E.2d at 835-36.
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The court of appeals first considered the issue of causation."'
According to the court, the problem was that the plaintiff could not
identify what had caused him to trip or provide any description of the
mechanism that caused him to fall." In fact, the plaintiff could not
even eliminate the possibility that he had tripped over his own feet.4 3
As the court noted, "A mere possibility of causation is not enough
...

""

The court then turned to the question of whether the defendant

should have been on notice that the plate-glass windows constituted a
hazard.' The plaintiff, however, failed to present any evidence that
the defendant knew (or was ever informed) that the plate-glass windows
should have been safety glass or that the defendant knew the windows
otherwise constituted a hazard to guests of the hotel." Accordingly,
the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in failing to grant the
defendant's motion for directed verdict."
In Walker v. Aderhold Properties,Inc.,' the court of appeals revisited
the issue of when and under what circumstances a landowner may be
held liable for a third-party criminal attack, ultimately concluding that
there were unresolved issues of material fact to address the issue.4 9
Early one morning the plaintiff was confronted in the hallway of her
apartment complex by two men. The men forced the plaintiff into her
apartment and sexually assaulted her. The plaintiff subsequently ified
suit against the management company of her apartment complex and
alleged the company had breached its duty to provide adequate security

41. Id. at 491, 693 S.E.2d at 836. Unlike the decision in Brown, the formal twopronged test from Robinson, see 268 Ga. at 748, 493 S.E.2d at 414, does not form the
structure for the court of appeals decision in ImperialInvestments. Compare 285 Ga. at
444, 679 S.E.2d at 28, with 303 Ga. App. at 491, 693 S.E.2d at 836. Rather, the court of
appeals opinion focuses primarily on the issue of causation. Imperial Inus., 303 Ga. App.
at 491-93, 693 S.E.2d at 836-37. The issue of causation constitutes a third prong in any
trip and fall analysis, although, as Charles R. Adams wisely notes, "[tihis seems to be an
issue overlooked in many slip and fall cases." CHARLEs R. ADAMS IlI, GEORGIA LAW OF
TORTs § 4-6(e) (2009-2010 ed.).
42. Imperial Invs., 303 Ga. App. at 492, 693 S.E.2d at 837.
43. Id. at 493, 693 S.E.2d at 837.
44. Id. at 491, 693 S.E.2d at 836 (quoting Pennington v. WJL, Inc., 263 Ga. App. 758,
760, 589 S.E.2d 259, 262 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. See id. at 493-94, 693 S.E.2d at 837-38 ("[The trial court ... granted summary
judgment on [the plaintiffs] negligence per se claim, finding no duty on the part of [the
defendant] to inspect an existing building and conform it to the latest building code
requirements.").
46. Id. at 493, 693 S.E.2d at 837-38.
47. Id. at 494, 693 S.E.2d at 838.
48. 303 Ga. App. 710, 694 S.E.2d 119 (2010).
49. See id. at 710-11, 694 S.E.2d at 120-21.
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and to keep the premises safe.' The plaintiff argued that one of the
features that had led her to select the apartment complex was the
security measures that were provided; however, many of those security
features were not operational at the time of the attack." The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and argued, inter alia, that
the plaintiff had "failed to establish that the attack was foreseeable."
In response, the plaintiff submitted "security company incident reports
and police reports" of other criminal acts on the premises. 3 However,
the trial court excluded the evidence as hearsay and granted the
defendants' motion. The plaintiff appealed."
The court of appeals explained that "landlords ... have a duty to
exercise ordinary care to prevent foreseeable third-party criminal attacks
upon tenants." Evidence of prior criminal activity on the premises
may be used to prove that a landlord-or management company, as the
case may be-was on notice that a crime against a person was reasonably foreseeable." The criminal activity does not have to be identical
but "must be substantially similar to the crime in question."57 The
defendants argued that the incident reports and police reports submitted
by the plaintiff were hearsay and therefore not admissible on the issue
of liability." As the court succinctly noted, "This, however, is not the
law." According to the court,
[a] landlord need not have actual knowledge of criminal conduct before
it may be held liable for failing to keep the premises safe; rather "[a]
landowner can be liable for third-party criminal attacks if the
landowner has reasonablegrounds to apprehend that such a criminal

act would be committed but fails to take steps to guard against
injury.'

50. Id. at 711, 694 S.E.2d at 121.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 711-12, 694 S.E.2d at 121.
55. Id. at 712, 694 S.E.2d at 121 (quoting Brookview Holdings, LLC v. Suarez, 285 Ga.
App. 90, 97, 645 S.E.2d 559, 566 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 713, 694 S.E.2d at 122.
59. Id.
60. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting TGM Ashley Lakes, Inc. v. Jennings, 264 Ga.
App. 456, 462, 590 S.E.2d 807, 816 (2003)).
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The court held that incident reports could properly be admitted to prove
that the management company had "reasonable grounds" to anticipate
the attack at issue."'
Next, the court of appeals addressed the nature of the prior incidents
and whether they were substantially similar to the incident giving rise
to the cause of action.62 Although the prior crimes were crimes against
property-burglaries-and not crimes against people-such as the
assault on the plaintiff-the court held that this fact did not resolve the
issue in favor of the defendant." Citing the decision in Sturbridge
Partners,LTD v. Walker," the court noted that "such a rigid approach
to determining foreseeability is not in keeping with either common sense
The court concluded that the issue of whether the
or existing law.'
defendant should have reasonably foreseen the risk of criminal assault
against its tenant based on its knowledge of the prior burglaries was a
question to be resolved by the jury." Therefore, the court of appeals
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendant."
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Andrews challenged the court of
appeals conclusion that the evidence of the prior burglaries raised a
According to Judge Andrews, two
question of fact for the jury.'
particular facts should have dictated the result of the case: (1) that the
initial attack occurred outside the plaintifrs apartment-that is, in a
common area; and (2) that there was no evidence of any prior violent

61. Id. The statement in the court's opinion that "[a] landlord need not have actual
knowledge of criminal conduct before it may be held liable for failing to keep the premises
safe," id., appears ripe for misinterpretation and must be read in the context of the opinion
as a whole. The court of appeals makes it clear that a plaintiff must still prove that a
landlord had reasonable grounds to apprehend that a criminal act would be committed.
Id. The court's opinion focuses on the nature of that proof and makes it clear that the
security incident reports tendered in this case were properly admissible for this purpose.
Id. The court of appeals further clarified that "the reports did not constitute hearsay" and
noted that "[als a fundamental rule, the definition of hearsay does not include out-of-court
statements which are not offered as proof of the facts asserted in such statement, but are
offered merely as proof that such a statement was made." Id (quoting Quicktrip Corp. v.
Childs, 220 Ga. App. 463, 466, 469 S.E.2d 763, 767 (1996)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. 267 Ga. 785, 482 S.E.2d 339 (1997).
65. Walker, 303 Ga. App. at 713, 694 S.E.2d at 122 (citing Sturbridge,267 Ga. at 786,
482 S.E.2d at 340).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 716, 694 S.E.2d at 124.
68. Id. (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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attacks on the premises." Citing the decision of the supreme court in
Doe v. Prudential-Bache/A.G. Spanos Realty Partners, L.P.,, Judge
Andrews noted that "property crimes ... committed in a common area
do not put a landlord on notice that a violent assault is likely to occur
in that area."n Accordingly, in the absence of any evidence of prior
violent attacks, Judge Andrews concluded that summary judgment for
the defendant was appropriate.72
II. LIABILITY FOR ANIMAL ATTACKS
In Kringle v. Elliott," the court of appeals affirmed the grant of a
directed verdict in favor of a dog owner under Georgia's "first bite"
rule." The plaintiff's seven-year-old son was bitten by the defendant's
golden retriever while playing in the defendant's backyard. The plaintiff
subsequently brought suit against the defendant on behalf of her son.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for directed verdict, and
the plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial
court erred in excluding evidence that the dog may have attacked other
animals."
As noted by the court of appeals, Georgia's first bite rule "does not
'literally require a first bite.' 7 6 Rather, the plaintiff must prove that
the animal had a "propensity to do the particular act (biting) which
caused injury" and that the owner of the animal had knowledge of that
propensity." With respect to her efforts to establish the defendant's
knowledge of the dog's alleged dangerous propensity, the plaintiff
contended that the trial court improperly excluded evidence of two
incidents. The first incident involved a situation in which the defendant
discovered the dog with a dead kitten in its mouth. In the second
incident, a neighbor of the defendant found the dog in her backyard with
The plaintiff argued that these
a puppy that eventually died."
incidents constituted evidence from which a jury could conclude that the

69. Id.
70. 268 Ga. 604, 492 S.E.2d 865 (1997).
71. Walker, 303 Ga. App. at 716, 694 S.E.2d at 124 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (citing
Prudential-Bache,268 Ga. at 606, 492 S.E.2d at 867).
72. Id.
73. 301 Ga. App. 1, 686 S.E.2d 665 (2009).
74. Id. at 1, 686 S.E.2d at 666.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1-2, 686 S.E.2d at 666 (quoting Phiel v. Boston, 262 Ga. App. 814, 816, 586
S.E.2d 718, 720 (2003)).
77. Id. at 2, 686 S.E.2d at 666 (quoting Phiel, 262 Ga. App. at 816, 586 S.E.2d at 720)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id. at 2, 686 S.E.2d at 666-67.
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dog had a dangerous propensity to attack other animals. 9 The court
of appeals, however, disagreed and noted that the evidence of propensity
was speculative.' No one saw the dog attack the kitten or the puppy,
and there were no bite marks on either animal." Accordingly, there
was simply no way for a jury to conclude "that the harm was caused by
a vicious attack rather than the overzealous play of a large dog."'
Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of a
directed verdict."
III. DRAM SHOP ACT
In Shin v. Estate of Camacho," an action filed under Georgia's Dram

Shop Act,' the court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of a
motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant.'
The
defendant hosted a party at his house attended by Seung Park. During
the course of the party, Park had several drinks and eventually got into
a heated confrontation with another guest. This confrontation effectively
ended the party and led the defendant to conclude that Park was
intoxicated. Unbeknownst to the defendant, however, Park had at least
two more drinks following the fight. The defendant's wife urged Park to
either rest before driving home or allow her to drive him home. The
defendant likewise urged Park to forego driving home until he was
sober. After resting for an uncertain amount of time at the defendant's
residence-somewhere between forty-five and ninety minutes-Park
decided to leave. Once again, the defendant and his wife tried to
convince Park not to drive. However, their efforts were unsuccessful.
As he was driving home, Park ran a red light and crashed into a car
driven by Stacey Camacho.' Camacho died as a result of the injuries
sustained in the crash.'
Following her death, Camacho's estate brought suit against the
defendant under Georgia's Dram Shop Act.' The defendant moved for
summary judgment on the ground that there was no evidence that he
knowingly served alcohol "to Park [while] Park was in a state of

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 2, 686 S.E.2d at 666.
Id. at 3, 686 S.E.2d at 667.
Id. at 2-3, 686 S.E.2d at 666-67.
Id. at 3, 686 S.E.2d at 667.
Id. at 4, 686 S.E.2d at 667.
302 Ga. App. 243, 690 S.E.2d 444 (2010).
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 (2000 & Supp. 2009).
Shin, 302 Ga. App. at 243, 690 S.E.2d at 445.
Id. at 243-44, 690 S.E.2d at 445.
Id. at 243, 690 S.E.2d at 445.
Id.
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noticeable intoxication."'
The trial court denied the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, and an appeal ensued."
Under Georgia's Dram Shop Act, a person who serves alcohol to
another "person of lawful drinking age [does] not thereby become liable
for injury, death, or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication
of such person." However, the Act further provides that a person who
serves alcohol to another person who is noticeably intoxicated "knowing
that such person will soon be driving a motor vehicle, may become liable
for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such
. .. person."9

In reversing the trial court's denial of summary judgment, the court
of appeals noted that there was no evidence that the defendant
knowingly served alcohol to Park while Park was in a state of noticeable
intoxication." However, evidence did show that the defendant first
discovered Park was intoxicated when the confrontation with the other
guest occurred, and the defendant did not serve Park the drinks he
consumed after the fight. To the contrary, once the defendant discovered
that Park was intoxicated, he made every effort to convince Park not to
drive until he was sober.'
IV.

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR LIABILITY

In Hicks v. Heard," the plaintiff suffered injuries arising from a car
crash with Jessica Heard, an "on-call" employee of the defendant and
daughter of one of the co-owners of the defendant company. The
plaintiff brought suit against the defendant under a theory of vicarious
liability, and the defendant responded by filing a motion for summary
judgment. The trial court granted the defendant's motion. The court of
appeals, in turn, affirmed the trial court's ruling and held that the
plaintiff had failed to prove that the on-call employee was acting within
the scope of her employment at the time of the car accident.9 7 The
supreme court granted certiorari to decide whether, under the supreme
court's decision in Allen Kane's Major Dodge, Inc. v. Barnes," "the

90. Id. at 244, 690 S.E.2d at 445-46.
91. Id. at 243, 690 S.E.2d at 445.
92. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b); Shin, 302 Ga. App. at 244, 690 S.E.2d at 446 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
93. O.C.GA § 51-1-40(b); Shin, 302 Ga. App. at 245, 690 S.E.2d at 446 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
94. Shin, 302 Ga. App. at 245, 690 S.E.2d at 446.
95. Id. at 246, 690 S.E.2d at 446-47.
96. 286 Ga. 864, 692 S.E.2d 360 (2010).
97. Id. at 864, 692 S.E.2d at 361.
98. 243 Ga. 776, 257 S.E.2d 186 (1979).
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[clourt of [aippeals gave proper weight to an employee's 'on-call' status
during the final step of the burden shifting framework laid out in...

[Allen Kane's Major Dodge].""
Under the burden-shifting framework in Allen Kane's Mqjor Dodge, if
the operator of a motor vehicle involved in a collision is shown to be
employed by the owner of that vehicle, "a presumption arises that the
employee was in the scope of his employment at the time of the
collision.""
The burden then shifts to the employer to prove that the
employee was not acting within the scope of employment at the time of
the accident."o1 If the employer satisfies this burden, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to prove, "in addition to the facts which give rise to
the presumption that he was in the course of his employment, some
other fact which indicates the employee was acting within the scope of
If the additional evidence submitted by the
his employment.""
plaintiff is "direct evidence," then the case proceeds to the jury.'03
"However, when the 'other fact' is [c]ircumstantial evidence, it must be
evidence sufficient to support a verdict in order to withstand the
defendant's motion for summary judgment."1 0o
In Hicks the supreme court concluded that the court of appeals had
properly applied the Alen Kane's Mqjor Dodge test, and thus, the
In reaching this conclusion, the court
supreme court affirmed."
First, at the time of the collision at
focused on two basic facts."
issue, Jessica Heard was driving home from school in a vehicle owned by
the defendant."o' Second, Jessica Heard was an on-call employee of
the defendant. 0" According to the court, these facts gave rise to the
initial presumption that Heard was acting within the scope of her
The defendant, however,
employment at the time of the accident."
successfully rebutted this presumption with evidence that Jessica Heard

99. Hicks, 286 Ga. at 864,692 S.E.2d at 361 (citingAllenKane's MqjorDodge, 243 Ga.
at 777, 257 S.E.2d at 188).
100. Hicks, 286 Ga. at 865, 692 S.E.2d at 361 (quoting Allen Kane's MajorDodge, 243
Ga. at 777, 257 S.E.2d at 188) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Id. (quoting Allen Kane's Mqjor Dodge, 243 Ga. at 777, 257 S.E.2d at 188).
102. Id. at 865-66, 692 S.E.2d at 362 (quoting Allen Kane's Mqjor Dodge, 243 Ga. at
780, 257 S.E.2d at 190) (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id. at 866, 692 S.E.2d at 362 (quoting Allen Kane's Mqjor Dodge, 243 Ga. at 780,
257 S.E.2d at 190).
104. Id. (quotingAllen Kane's Mqjor Dodge, 243 Ga. at 780,257 S.E.2d at 190) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
105. 286 Ga. at 867-68, 692 S.E.2d at 362-63.
106. See id. at 867, 692 S.E.2d at 362-63.
107. Id. at 866-67, 692 S.E.2d at 362.
108. Id. at 867, 692 S.E.2d at 362-63.
109. Id. at 867, 692 S.E.2d at 362.
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was on a purely personal mission at the time of the accident and
therefore was not acting within the scope of her employment.1 o Thus,
the burden shifted back to the plaintiff to submit some additional fact
to prove that Heard was acting within the scope of her employment at
the time of the accident.u The plaintiff pointed to the fact that Heard
was on-call at the time of the accident.'1 2 The court concluded that the
evidence that Heard was an on-call employee constituted only circumstantial evidence, not direct evidence, and that it was not "sufficient to
support a verdict."" Consequently, the supreme court affirmed the
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant."
V. DEFAMATION

In Community Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. King,"' King, a healthcare worker, sued a newspaper and reporter, alleging he had been
libeled in two newspaper articles. Viewed in the light most favorable to
King, as was required at the stage of a motion to dismiss, the facts
showed that King was employed as a healthcare worker at Central State
Hospital. During King's employment, two Baldwin County prisoners

110. Id. at 866-67, 692 S.E.2d at 362.
111. Id. at 867, 692 S.E.2d at 362-63.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 868, 692 S.E.2d at 363. Interestingly, most of the supreme court's majority
opinion is actually spent addressing Justice Carley's dissent in this case. See id. at 868-70
& n.2, 871 n.2, 873, 875 n.4, 692 S.E.2d at 363-64 n.1, 365 n.2, 366-67, 368 n.4. In his
dissent, Justice Carley opines, "[T]o the extent that (clourt of [alppeals[] opinions have held
that an employee's on-call status, in conjunction with her employer's ownership of the
vehicle, is not sufficient 'to get the case to the jury,' they should be overruled." Id. at 878,
692 S.E.2d at 370 (Carley, J., dissenting). The majority opinion expresses the concern that
Justice Carley's approach would effectively establish "24-hour employer liability for on-call
employees." Id. at 875, 692 S.E.2d at 367 (majority opinion) (quoting Thurmon v. Sellers,
62 S.W.3d 145, 154 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). Justice Carley acknowledged this concern in
his dissent and recommended the following to the supreme court:
[Aldopt the following non-exhaustive list of factors . . . to provide guidance in
determining whether an on-call employee was acting within the scope of her
employment while driving her employer's vehicle at the time of a collision:
"1. Whether, at the time of the accident, the employee's use of the vehicle
benefitted the employer, 2. Whether the employee was subject to the employer's
control at the time of the accident; 3. Whether the employee's ... activities were
restricted while on call; 4. Whether the use of the vehicle at the time of the
accident was authorized by the employer; and 5. What the employee's primary
reason for using the vehicle was at the time of the injury-producing accident."
Id. at 879, 692 S.E.2d at 370 (Carley, J., dissenting) (quoting Thurmon v. Sellers, 62
S.W.3d 145, 155).
115. 299 Ga. App. 267, 682 S.E.2d 346 (2009).
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escaped from the hospital. King was suspected of having assisted the
two escapees. Marney, a reporter, wrote two articles about King's
alleged assistance in the escape. The articles at issue were published in
two separate issues of the newspaper: once on December 22, 2006, and
once in the December 23-25, 2006 weekend edition. The first article
stated that the warrant had been issued for King's arrest and discussed
King's alleged aid in the prisoners' escape. The article quoted the
Baldwin County Sheriff, stating "that officers were actively looking for
King," and they "consider his assistance to the escapees as a big or
Subsequent to King's arrest,
bigger crime than the escape itself.""1
Marney wrote the second article titled, "Escape [Aiccomplice [Airrested."u' The article stated in its body that "'deputies [had] arrested ...
King ...

for aiding the escape of two Baldwin County prisoners'; . . .

King had been charged with 'aiding another to escape from ... custody';
and King 'could face up to five years in prison if found guilty and
convicted.'""
Finally, Marney quoted the sheriff, stating "that King
'allegedly gave [a] key' to one of the prisoners." 1 9
After the charges against King were dismissed for reasons not stated
in the case, King filed suit against the newspaper and Marney.12
King alleged "that the statements in the articles, [including] the
headline of the second article, constituted libel per se."l2 1 In his
lawsuit, King sought compensatory damages, "punitive damages, and
damages for emotional distress suffered from having been 'falsely
The defendants moved for and
charged with criminal offenses.'""
were denied summary judgment. The trial court granted a certificate of
immediate review.'
The defendants claimed on appeal "that (1) the
content of the articles [was] privileged, and (2) the headline of the
second article, read in conjunction with the [first] article, [was] not
libelous.""'
The court of appeals first addressed the definition of newspaper libel
and the exception to that definition under section 51-5-7(8) of the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.),'2 which provides that "'Itruthful reports of information received from any arresting officer or police

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 268, 682 S.E.2d at 347-48.
Id. at 268, 682 S.E.2d at 348.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 268-69, 682 S.E.2d at 348.
Id. at 269, 682 S.E.2d at 348.
O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7(8) (2000).
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authorities' are conditionally privileged.""
For a statement to be
conditionally privileged in a published article, the language in the article
must constitute "a fair and honest report of information obtained from
police records and police authorities."'s
The reporter submitted an affidavit with her summary judgment
motion that declared "that the statements in both articles were derived
from an interview with [the sheriff] and a report issued by hospital
police [and] that she had no reason to doubt the accuracy of [that]
information."' The report from the hospital police stated "that King
had been identified as being the staff member who gave a pass key to
one of the escaped inmates and that" as a result of the actions alleged
against King, "the [police] investigator had been advised to press charges
against King."12 The report went on to provide that King's arrest took
place on December 22 and that King denied that he gave the key to the
inmate. In his deposition, King did not dispute the facts stated in the
articles that a warrant had been issued for him or that he had been
arrested and posted bond."*
The court of appeals noted that
[blecause falsity is an essential element of both libel and slander, truth
is a perfect defense to a defamation action. Accordingly, where a
publication is substantially accurate, and if the article is published by
the newspaper in good faith and the same is substantially accurate, the
newspaper has a complete defense. As long as facts are not misstated,
distorted or arranged so as to convey a false and defamatory meaning,
there is no liability for a somewhat less than complete report of the
truth, even if the newspaper conveys its own editorial opinions.m
Based on that standard, the court held "that the newspaper articles
fairly, honestly, and with substantial accuracy, reflect[ed] statements in
the investigative report [which] identiflied] King as a suspect in the
prison escape" and that the information was supported by the reporter's

126. Cmty. Newspaper, 299 Ga. App. at 269, 682 S.E.2d at 348 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 515-7(8)). Newspaper libel is defined as "[a]ny false and malicious defamation of another in
any newspaper, magazine, or periodical, tending to injure the reputation of the person and
expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." Id (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted); O.C.G.A. § 51-5-2(a) (2000).
127. Cmty. Newspaper, 299 Ga. App. at 269, 682 S.E.2d at 348 (quoting Torrance v.
Morris Publ'g Grp., LLC, 281 Ga. App. 563, 571, 636 S.E.2d 740, 746 (2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
128. Id.

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. (quoting Lucas v. Cranshaw, 289 Ga. App. 510, 512, 659 8.E.2d 612, 615
(2008)).
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affidavit.13 2 The court noted that privilege is generally a jury issue,
yet it declared that when statements are privileged as a matter of law,
courts will grant summary judgment.'"
The court of appeals next turned to the appellants' contention that the
trial court erred in denying summary judgment with regard to the
headline of the second article." King argued that because the charge
for aiding the prisoners in the escape was ultimately dismissed, the
headline, which implied he was an accomplice, constituted libel."' In
response to this argument, the court declared that a headline "must be
read in conjunction with the article" and not in isolation."" The court
noted that when an allegedly defamatory statement is read in context
and "is so unambiguous as to reasonably bear but one interpretation,"
it is a matter of law whether the statement is defamatory.'3 7 The
court further stated that an average reader's construction of a writing
is paramount to a determination of whether a court should rule that the
writing is defamatory.'
Ultimately, the court held that "[rleading the
headline in conjunction with the article, . . . the average reader would

believe that King had been arrested" and that after the arrest, the
charges against him were "aiding another to escape from custody, which
was true;" therefore, the statement was not defamatory.139 Given this
determination, the court of appeals ruled that the headline alone did not
constitute an actionable circumstance.14o
The case of Community Newspaper creates an interesting situation.
The court of appeals held as a matter of law that the headline, which
implied King was involved in the crime, was not libelous because the
average reader would read the article, which was true at the time the
The Authors question whether the average
article was published.'
reader reads an entire newspaper article and further question at what
stage a reporter crosses the line into defaming someone in a headline.
While the headline at issue in this case was not overly derogatory

132. Id. at 270, 682 S.E.2d at 348.
133. Id. at 270, 682 S.E.2d at 348-49 (quoting Torrance, 281 Ga. App. at 571, 636
S.E.2d at 746).
134. Id. at 270, 682 S.E.2d at 349.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting Constitution Publ'g Co. v. Andrews, 50 Ga. App. 116, 117, 177 S.E.
258, 259 (1934)).
138. Id. at 271, 682 S.E.2d at 349 (quoting Cox Enters., Inc. v. Nix, 274 Ga. 801, 803,
560 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2002)).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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towards King, it would be interesting to see whether the court of appeals
would hold true to this precedent in the event a headline was more
injurious but contained truth in the accompanying article.
VI.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

On February 16, 2005, Governor Sonny Perdue'42 signed into law
Senate Bill 3,'" commonly referred to as the Tort Reform Act of 2005.
O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1,'" which established a series of caps on noneconomic damages recoverable in a medical malpractice action,"'s was added
by section 13 of the 'brt Reform Act.1 46
In Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, PC. v. Nestlehutt, the supreme
court held that the statutory caps on "noneconomic damages ...

in

O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1 violate the right to a jury trial as guaranteed [by] the
Georgia Constitution."'
The plaintiff brought suit against the
defendant after a botched facelift and laser resurfacing procedure left
her permanently disfigured. At the conclusion of trial, the jury awarded
the plaintiff $1,265,000, which included $900,000 in noneconomic
damages for the plaintiff's pain and suffering. The applicable cap under
O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1 would have reduced the award of damages to
$350,000. The plaintiff, however, moved to have the statutory caps
declared unconstitutional. The trial court granted the motion and
awarded the plaintiff the full jury verdict.4 " On appeal, the supreme
court affirmed. "o

142. Governor Sonny Perdue was in office from January 2003 until January 2011.
143. Ga. S. Bill 3, Spec. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws 1 (codified in scattered sections of
O.C.G.A. tit. 9,24, 33,43 & 51).
144. O.C.GA. § 51-13-1 (Supp. 2010).
145. Id. For example, O.C.GA. § 51-13-1(b) provides that
[iun any verdict returned or judgment entered in a medical malpractice action,
including an action for wrongful death, against one or more health care providers,
the total amount recoverable by a claimant for noneconomic damages in such
action shall be limited to an amount not to exceed $350,000.00, regardless of the
number of defendant health care providers against whom the claim is asserted or
the number of separate causes of action on which the claim is based.
Id. O.C.GA § 51-13-1 contains four separate provisions that limit the amount of
noneconomic damages recoverable in a medical malpractice action. Id. § 51-13-1(b) to (e).
146. Ga. S. Bill 3 at § 13, 2005 Ga. Laws at 16-17 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1).
147. 286 Ga. 731, 691 S.E.2d 218 (2010).
148. Id. at 738, 691 S.E.2d at 224.
149.

Id. at 731, 691 S.E.2d at 220.

150. Id.
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Article I of the Georgia Constitution"5 ' provides that "[tihe right to
trial by jury shall remain inviolate." 52 This provision, however, only
applies to those categories of actions for which the right to a jury trial
existed "at common law or by statute at the time of the adoption of the
Georgia Constitution in 1798."'" Citing to the doctrine of "mala
praxis"' and the recognition of claims of medical neglect in a number
of late eighteenth century and early to mid-nineteenth century cases, the
supreme court concluded that a right to a jury trial existed at common

law for such claims at the time of the adoption of the Georgia Constitution in

1 79 8 ."

Furthermore, the court concluded that this right

includes the right to obtain an "award of the full measure of damages,
including noneconomic damages, as determined by the jury."se
Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that "[tihe very existence of
the caps, in any amount, is violative of the right to trial by jury. 57
The supreme court went on to consider, but ultimately reject, three
arguments made by the defendant in support of the statutory caps.s
First, the defendant argued that the Georgia General Assembly had the
authority to modify the common law.'59 The court agreed that the

legislature has the general authority to modify the common law but
rejected "the notion that this general authority empowers the [1legislature to abrogate constitutional rights that may inhere in common law
Second, the defendant suggested that to the
causes of action.""
extent the legislature can authorize the imposition of double or treble
damages, it is likewise reasonable that the legislature would have the
However, the court noted that
inherent authority to cap damages.'
double or treble damages add to and "affirm the integrity of [the jury's]
award," unlike statutory caps which limit or "nullify" that award.'"
Finally, the defendant argued that statutory caps should be upheld on

151. GA. CONST. art. I.
152. Id. art. I, § 1, para. 11(a).
153. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 733, 691 S.E.2d at 221 (quoting Benton v. Ga. Marble Co.,
258 Ga. 58, 66, 365 S.E.2d 413, 420 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. The term "mala praxis" is defined as "fm]alpractice; unskillful treatment, esp. by
a doctor." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1042 (9th ed. 2009); see WIUJAM BIACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 122 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (1768).
155. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 733-35, 691 S.E.2d at 221-23.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 736, 691 S.E.2d at 223.
158. Id. at 736-37, 691 S.E.2d at 223-24.
159. Id. at 736, 691 S.E.2d at 223.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 737, 691 S.E.2d at 224.
162. Id.
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the basis of their similarity to the trial court's remittitur authority.'"
The supreme court, however, disposed of this argument by noting that
the remittitur authority "is a corollary of the courts' constitutionally
derived authority to grant new trials under ... the Georgia Constitution" and, unlike the statutory caps, "is a carefully circumscribed power"
that is applied only in "limited circumstance[s]."1 "
VII. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The case of Clarke v. Freeman" arises from the tragic circumstances of Brian Nichols's escape from the Fulton County Courthouse on
March 11, 2005. On that day, Nichols entered the Fulton County
Courthouse under the custody of the Fulton County Sheriff's Department."' Nichols had been charged with burglary, rape, and aggravated assault, and his trial was set to continue that day before Fulton
County Superior Court Judge Rowland Barnes. Nichols, however, had
other plans. Nichols overpowered a deputy in his holding cell, took her
gun, and headed for Judge Rowland's chambers. Along the way he
encountered Susan Christy and Gina Clarke, Judge Barnes's case
manager and assistant case manager. Nichols ordered the women into
the judge's chambers, threatened them, and handcuffed them. He then
proceeded into the courtroom, where he shot Judge Barnes and his court
reporter.xer
Christy and Clarke subsequently brought suit against the Fulton
County Sheriff and numerous employees in the Sheriff's department for
damages arising from infliction of emotional distress." The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants failed to follow departmental policies in
responding to a threat made by Nichols, in responding to the discovery
of a weapon on Nichols, and in the level of security and oversight
The
provided at the courthouse and in the judge's chambers.'
defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs'
complaints failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the plaintiffs
0
appealed.17

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
302 Ga. App. 831, 692 S.E.2d 80 (2010).
Id. at 834, 692 S.E.2d at 83.
Id. at 832, 834-35, 692 S.E.2d at 82-84.
Id. at 835, 692 S.E.2d at 84.
Id. at 833-35, 692 S.E.2d at 83-84.
Id. at 835, 692 S.E.2d at 84.
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On appeal, the court of appeals first noted that in ruling on the motion
to dismiss, the trial court was required to construe the evidence in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff."' Moreover, the motion should
not have been "granted unless it appear[ed) to a certainty that the plaintiff[s] would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could
be proved."" 2 The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs' claim was
barred by Georgia's "impact rule," which requires that in order for a
plaintiff to recover damages for emotional distress resulting from
negligent conduct, the plaintiff must sustain a physical impact that
The plaintiffs had not suffered any
results in physical injury.17
a
physical impact arising from their
of
a
result
as
physical injury
confrontation with Nichols.174 However, an exception to the physical
impact requirement arises when a defendant engages in malicious,
wilful, or wanton behavior that is directed at the plaintiff." Under
Nonetheless,
those circumstances, no physical impact is required.'
may
have been
actions
defendants'
the trial court held that although the
was
not
directed
behavior
wanton,
the
defendants'
malicious, wilful, or
17
disagreed."'
The court of appeals
at the plaintiffs.
According to the court of appeals, the plaintiffs had alleged facts that,
if taken as true, showed that the defendants were aware of a threat
directed toward Judge Barnes and his employees, were aware that a
weapon had been confiscated from Nichols, and failed to provide proper
security to the courtroom and the judge's chambers.179 As such, the
court concluded the defendants' behavior could clearly be construed as
having been "directed toward the members of Judge Barnes's chamber
(by virtue of the defendants' alleged knowledge of Nichols's threat[s] or
possession of a weapon)."" Accordingly, the court of appeals held that
the trial court erred in granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. 8 '

171. Id. at 832, 692 S.E.2d at 82 (quoting Ford v. Whipple, 225 Ga. App. 276, 277,483
S.E.2d 591, 592 (1997)).
172. Id. (quoting Whipple, 225 Ga. App. at 277, 483 S.E.2d at 592) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
173. Id at 836, 692 S.E.2d at 84.
174. Id. at 835 n.6, 692 S.E.2d at 84 n.6.
175. Id at 836, 692 S.E.2d at 84.
176. Id
177. Id. at 835, 692 S.E.2d at 84.
178. Id
179. Id at 836, 692 S.E.2d at 85.
180. Id. at 836-37, 692 S.E.2d at 85.
181. Id at 837, 692 S.E.2d at 85.
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VIII. NEGLIGENCE
In Harper v. Barge Air Conditioning, Inc.,m the court of appeals
reversed the grant of a directed verdict in favor of the defendant in a
negligence action.m The plaintiff was the manager of an AutoZone
store. In May 2005, the store's air conditioning malfunctioned.
Representatives from the defendant made several service calls to the
store during the month in an effort to fix the problem. On the morning
of May 25, one of the defendant's technicians once again attempted to
repair one of the store's two heating, ventilating, and air conditioning
(HVAC) units. The repair was apparently unsuccessful, as the store
continued to get hotter through the day. The plaintiff worked throughout the day in the store and well into the evening along with two other
employees. Late in the evening, all three employees became ill.
Eventually it was confirmed that the employees had suffered carbon
monoxide poisoning. Early the next morning, representatives from the
fire department confirmed the presence of a high level of carbon
monoxide in the store and took steps to vent the store. However, the
carbon monoxide level almost immediately returned to a high level. The
HVAC units were examined later that day by the defendant's owner and
a service technician. According to the defendant, no problems were
detected with the units.'" Notably, however, the store did not encounter any further problems with the level of carbon monoxide after the
units were examined by the defendant."a
The plaintiff subsequently brought suit against the defendant and
alleged that she had been exposed to high levels of carbon monoxide as
a result of the negligence of the defendant's service technician. At trial
the plaintiff presented evidence that a gas burner in the HVAC units
was the only possible source of carbon monoxide on the day in question. e An expert hired by the plaintiff testified that the improper
replacement of a service panel in the HVAC unit on the day of the
plaintiff's injury had caused the unit to emit carbon monoxide." Even

182. 300 Ga. App. 901, 686 S.E.2d 668 (2009).
183. Id. at 902, 686 S.E.2d at 669.
184. Id. at 902-04, 686 S.E.2d at 669-71.
185. See id. at 906, 686 S.E.2d at 672.
186. Id. at 901-02, 686 S.E.2d at 669. There was evidence that a propane-powered floor
buffer had been used in the store that same evening; however, subsequent testing of the
floor buffer indicated that it had been working properly and could not have been the source
of the carbon monoxide, particularly since the carbon monoxide level increased even in the
absence of the buffer. Id at 903-04, 686 S.E.2d 670-71.
187. Id. at 905, 686 S.E.2d at 671.
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though "the technician testified he replaced the panel and the owner
testified the panel was in place when he inspected it, the expert testified
that no other scenario explained how [the plaintiffJ became poisoned
The trial court, however, granted the
with carbon monoxide."'
defendant's motion for directed verdict, and the plaintiff appealed.'
In reversing the trial court, the court of appeals noted that "[a] court
cannot direct a verdict where there is any reasonable inference
supported by evidence which would authorize a verdict to the contrary."1 9 In this regard, the court of appeals identified two grounds
that supported reversal of the trial court's decision. 191 First, the court
held that there was clear circumstantial evidence that the defendant's
negligence had caused the plaintiff's injuries." As the court noted,
[If you find carbon monoxide gas in your store after the technician
services your air conditioner, all sources of emission save the HVAC
system are eliminated, and the problem never returns after the same
company examines your system again, it is reasonable to conclude that
the technician caused the carbon monoxide emission."
Second, because the HVAC units were under the exclusive control of the
defendant, the facts supported an inference of negligence under a theory
of res ipsa loquitur.x' Thus, the court of appeals held that the trial
court had erred in directing a verdict in the defendant's favor.19

188. Id.
189. Id. at 901-02, 686 S.E.2d at 669.
190. Id. at 906, 686 S.E.2d at 672.
191. Id. at 906-07, 686 S.E.2d at 672.
192. Id. at 906, 686 S.E.2d at 672.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 906-07, 686 S.E.2d at 672. The elements of res ipsa loquitur include that
"(1) the injury ordinarily would not occur in the absence of negligence; (2) the injury was
caused by an agent or instrument within the defendant's exclusive control; and (3) the
injury was not due to any voluntary action or contribution on the plaintiffs part." Id. at
907, 686 S.E.2d at 672.
195. Id. at 907, 686 S.E.2d at 673.

